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HUMAN PERFORMANCE TRAINING: 
SUCCESSES AND FAILURES IN CIVIL AVIATION 
 
 
Alan E. Diehl, Ph.D., ATP, CPE 
Retired NTSB, FAA & USAF Air Safety Investigator 
Albuquerque, New Mexico 
 
 
For over twenty years, two similar types of training have attempted to reduce aviator 
caused accidents.  Crew Resource Management was widely adopted by U.S. airlines, and 
has generally been credited with helping to dramatically reduce their accident rates.  
Interestingly, CRM was embraced with little scientific evidence that it could actually 
reduce operational errors.  In contrast, Aeronautical Decision Making, aimed at general 
aviation users, underwent a series of double-blind experiments before being adopted.  
And, although some users suggested ADM training significantly reduced their accidents, 
it was never fully implemented.  This may explain the limited improvement in general 
aviation accident rates, when compared with the airline rates for the last two decades. 
 
 
     “Human error” has historically been associated with approximately three quarters of all 
aviation accidents, and various studies have indicated aviator decision making failures were 
associated with the majority of fatal civilian crashes, (e.g., Diehl, 1992).  Two major training 
efforts were launched in the 1980s to deal with these problems.  These similar programs, Crew 
Resource Management and Aeronautical Decision Making, were proffered as cost-effective and 
quick methods of reducing such accidents. 
 
Crew Resource Management 
 
While serving as a National Transportation Safety Board investigator, I drafted the first 
recommendation calling for the implementation of Crew Resource Management training by this 
nation’s airlines.  This occurred after a 1978 United Airlines DC-8 crash.  The crew detected a 
landing gear unsafe light, and entered a holding pattern, only to run out of fuel 66 minutes later 
over the suburbs of Portland, Oregon.  The captain, fixating on the gear light problem, had 
ignored repeated queries from the other two crew members about their fuel status, (NTSB, 1979). 
 
Per the NTSB recommendation, United instituted CRM training in 1981.  And within 
several years most U.S. major carriers followed suit.  Although, the Federal Aviation 
Administration did not formally require CRM for all FAR Part 121 carriers until 1995. 
 
NTSB investigators must carefully justify proposed recommendations.  So I examined the 
limited evidence that CRM training would work.  I reviewed the research conducted earlier under 
the direction of Dr. John Lauber at the NASA Ames Research Center, including the simulator 
studies done by Dr. H. P. Ruffell-Smith.  In addition, contemporary research on the recognition of 
“subtle incapacitation” done at United Airlines as well as Line Oriented Flight Training being 
conducted by Northwest Airlines, looked promising.   
 
As an adjunct professor of management, I also recognized the similarity of CRM to 
another type of training used in industrial settings.  Total Quality Management empowered 
workers to speak-up and actively participate in decision making about products and production 
processes.  TQM had been successfully utilized for decades and was credited with helping the 
 
successful renaissance in Japanese industry after World War II.  Ironically, it was the brainchild 
of an American, Dr. Edwards Deming. 
 
CRM-related errors also seemed to be factors in several well-known crashes.  These 
accidents included the 1972 Eastern Airlines L-1011 crash into the Everglades and the tragic 
collision of the KLM and Pan-American B-747s on the runway at Tenerife in 1977.  Such 
catastrophes suggested that issues like loss of situational awareness, communication breakdowns, 
as well as individual and collective judgment errors needed to be addressed.  
 
Thus, adopting CRM training seemed logical, even without any statistical data or 
controlled experiments to “prove” it worked.  In any case, I felt a new type of training to manage 
resources on the flight deck was an idea whose time had come, and the NTSB members, as well 
as United’s management and the union apparently agreed. 
 
The FAA authorized an18-month evaluation of the prototype CRM program.  The 
Agency even assisted United to defer some of the costs of the program’s development, and the 
two-day training sessions for its flight crews.  The FAA did this by granting the airline an 
“exemption” allowing its captains to take line checks, instead of going to simulator training every 
six months.  Thus, captains only received simulator training once a year.  I was aware of this 
arrangement, because I had transferred from the NTSB to become the FAA headquarters program 
scientist for human performance, in 1981.     
 
However, some people legitimately questioned whether this type of training really 
worked.  The term “psycho-babble” was used by some FAA bureaucrats.  But I retorted that 
CRM training provided a host of pragmatic techniques to reduce the probability and the 
consequences of errors -- what others would later call “threat and error management.” 
 
Other airlines soon approached the FAA requesting exemptions for their proposed CRM 
programs, but not all of these programs were well designed.  This was a legitimate concern for 
the Agency.  So, in 1983, I hired Dr. Richard Jensen to examine cutting-edge CRM training 
programs in use around the globe, and to show the FAA how best to certify such programs and 
airmen enrolled therein.    
 
I was also delighted to hear that NASA was also developing instruments like the Cockpit 
Management Attitude Questionnaire to evaluate the views of airmen about CRM.  However, such 
measures could not answer the question of whether this training reduced the number of errors 
during “normal” much less emergency operations, (Wiener, Kanki & Helmreich, 1993). 
 
But perhaps the best evidence that CRM actually worked came from a couple of 
accidents experienced by United Airlines crews after being exposed to the concepts for several 
years.  In August 1989 a United DC-10’s center engine exploded in-flight, severing hydraulic 
lines and eliminating all aerodynamic controls.  The only way to control the jet was through 
differential power of the two remaining engines, (NTSB, 1990a). 
 
The DC-10 crew led by Captain Al Haynes allowed another off-duty captain handle the 
thrust levers, and they were able to successful crash land at the Sioux City airport.  This widely 
reported feat of airmanship saved the lives of the majority of the passengers aboard the ill-fated 
craft.  Captain Haynes has repeatedly stated the use of CRM was essential in their success that 
fateful afternoon, (Haynes, 1991). 
 
 
Several months earlier another United crew faced an almost as demanding situation.  
Their 747 had departed Honolulu, but as they passed through 22,000 feet, a forward cargo door 
failed, ripping away part of the aircraft’s fuselage.  The explosive decompression ejected nine 
passengers and baggage, and damaged both starboard engines, along with the wing’s leading edge 
devices, (NTSB, 1990b). 
 
Using various CRM techniques they managed to safely return to Hawaii without the 
further loss of life.  For instance, the second officer soon recognized they were far too heavy for 
the rapidly up-coming two-engine-out emergency landing.  But, he just could not get the 
bewildered captain’s attention, so he quickly decided to dump fuel himself.  I appreciated the 
irony of this situation, because in my 1978 United DC-8 crash, the second officer could not get 
the captain’s attention about their low fuel state.  Certainly, CRM techniques played a role in 
saving this 747 and its passengers. 
 
Obviously, trying to make precise statistical statements about extremely infrequent events 
is always a problem.  It has been noted elsewhere that because airline accidents are so infrequent 
it is difficult to establish the precise role that CRM has played in the reduction in these accidents, 
(Helmreich, Merritt & Wilhelm, 1999). 
 
Furthermore, many things besides the use of CRM have changed in the aviation system in 
recent decades.  These changes included: the advent of highly automated airliners, more effective 
air traffic management procedures, installation of newer types of cockpit warning devices, all of 
which probably helped enhance airline safety. 
 
Incidentally, the USAF Military Airlift Command began using CRM in 1985.  This 
change was ordered by their commander and took place in just three-months.  While military 
transports faced different flying conditions, often with less experienced crews, it was interesting 
to examine the statistical changes that occurred after this program began. 
 
I computed there was a 51% reduction in mishaps during the five-year period after the 
program’s implementation, when compared with the previous five-year period.  This was 
statistically significant at the .05 level.  And unlike the protracted airline implementation period, 
little else changed for this command during that decade-long time span.  Thus, this military 
evidence suggested CRM was a factor in the improved airline safety, (Diehl, 1992). 
 
Aeronautical Decision Making 
 
The other major type of human performance training focused on general aviation pilots.  
It was originally called “judgment training” and the initial research was led by Dr. Richard Jensen 
under FAA contract in the mid-1970s.  A major conclusion of his landmark study was that 52% 
of U.S. fatal general aviation accidents were caused by pilot judgment errors.  Jensen also 
recommended that prototype training materials be developed and their effectiveness be measured, 
(Jensen & Benel, 1977). 
 
The “judgment training” label continued through the development of the early manuals 
and other materials.  This work was done at Embry Riddle Aeronautical University, under the 
leadership of Dr. Jerry Berlin.  I was soon asked by FAA officials to assume the technical 
direction of the program as well as the evaluation of the prototype materials.  The FAA wanted to 
insure such training was effective before proceeding further. 
 
 
Judgment training materials taught many of the same concepts used by airline CRM 
programs, but the information and case studies were drawn from general aviation situations and 
single pilot operations.  Subject pilots learned about the effects that several types of hazardous 
attitudes have on performance, as well as concepts such as stress management, risk management, 
and attention management. 
 
And they were also given various “rules and tools” to help improve their decision-
making.  For example, the “I’M SAFE” mnemonic reminded subjects that before flying they 
needed to insure they were free of the following conditions: Illness, Medications, Stress, Alcohol, 
Fatigue, and to ensure they had Eaten properly. 
 
A major challenge in evaluating this training was whether or not pilots would use the 
concepts in “normal” situations.  Determining if those pilots who had received judgment training 
performed differently than control group subjects was a requirement.  It was decided to measure 
the decision-making of all pilots during short cross-country flights when they did not know their 
judgment was being carefully observed. 
 
After receiving the prototype judgment training materials, Embry Riddle subject pilots 
made 17% fewer decisional errors than student pilots in the control group who had not received 
this training.   These results, while preliminary, suggested pilot judgment could be improved 
through training, (Berlin, et. al., 1982). 
 
Various organizations around the world became interested in the topic.  For instance, 
Gary Livack and his employer the General Aviation Manufacturers Association offered to help 
develop cutting-edge audiovisual materials along with improved training manuals. 
 
Dr. Georgette Bush of Transport Canada led the effort there, and conducted two 
additional studies.  One study examined private pilots and another involved pilots training for 
their commercial licenses.  Both studies used the new and improved training manuals, and the 
commercial students also were exposed to more sophisticated audiovisual materials.  The two 
double-blind studies in Canada indicated private pilots receiving judgment training averaged 9% 
fewer errors, while commercial pilots (who got a more comprehensive program) averaged 40% 
fewer errors, when compared to those pilots assigned to the respective control groups, (Bush and 
Diehl, 1983). 
 
An additional study of private pilot judgment was undertaken for the Australian 
government by Dr. Ross Telfer.  While another study, sponsored by the USAF and directed by 
Dr. Tom Connelly, used instrument-rated ROTC cadets.  Here pilots faced simulated emergencies 
in GAT-1 instrument training devices. 
 
In all five experiments, pilots receiving judgment training outperformed their 
contemporaries at statistically significant levels.  The measured improvements averaged from a 
low of 8% fewer errors up to 46% fewer errors in the case of the instrument rated pilots study.  
This wide variation in the amounts of experimental group improvement was attributed to: the 
differences in the quality of the training manuals, the sophistication of other training media, and 
the emphasis placed on this training by instructors, (Diehl, 1992).   
 
The FAA and the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association wondered what would be the 
effect of making judgment training available, but not mandatory.  So I made another study of 
private pilots at ten fixed base operators in the U.S.  This time the experimental subjects were 
 
simply given the training manuals without any encouragement or instructions on how to use 
them. 
 
The FAA was also evaluating new sectional chart designs at the time, which provided an 
opportunity to observe the “normal” behavior of both experimental and control group subjects.  
Incidentally, the observers posed as cartographers, while unobtrusively recording the in flight 
judgment performance of subjects. 
 
The results of this well-controlled double-blind study produced a 10% reduction in errors 
for the experiment pilots who were given the manuals.  While statistically significant, the results 
also suggested the training would be much more effective if the subjects believed they were going 
to be evaluated on the materials during actual FAA flight tests, (Diehl, 1992). 
 
And it was soon concluded the “judgment” was not the best label for such training.  This 
was because many student pilots were older, highly successful, professional people who did not 
think their youngish instructors could improve their judgment.  Hence, I decided to rebrand the 
training as Aeronautical Decision Making.  And a series of ADM training manuals was developed 
for various categories of pilots, such as Students and Private Pilots, Instrument Pilots, Air Taxi 
Pilots, Helicopter Pilots, etc. 
 
Shortly after these training manuals were completed in 1987, I transferred from FAA to 
the USAF, and several other key personnel associated ADM development also went on to other 
assignments.  The result was this training was never fully implemented by the FAA.  In fact, it 
was not until 1997 that it became “theoretically” mandatory training. 
 
Interestingly, some people in the helicopter community immediately embraced this 
training.  Bell Helicopters Inc. and Petroleum Helicopters Inc. vigorously pursued ADM training 
for the pilots flying their equipment.  These two organizations soon reported dramatic drops in 
their respective accidents rates.  Bell saw a 48% drop in their U.S. Jetrangers accidents, while 
PHI experienced a 54% drop in their accidents, (Fox, 1991; Adams & Diehl, 1988). 
 
Unfortunately, unlike Bell and PHI, the broader general aviation community never 
thoroughly applied ADM concepts.  Ironically, a 1999 study by former FAA inspector, Doug 
Hawley, confirmed this fact.  He determined that Certified Flight Instructors spend very little time 
teaching ADM.  In fact, of the instructors he surveyed, 33% had never heard of ADM, only 13% 
knew it was actually mandatory, and a mere 3% could explain how to obtain the FAA materials 




The widely applied CRM training programs appear to have helped dramatically reduce 
airline accidents in recent decades.  Furthermore, the failure to give general aviation pilots ADM 
training may well have contributed to the relatively paltry reduction in their accidents.  
 
The U.S. general aviation accident data stands in sharp contrast with the progress made 
by this nation’s airlines over the past 20 years.  In fact, the latest data available from the NTSB 
(for 1990 to 2009) indicates the accident rate for all fatal FAR Part 121 airlines decreased by 
78%, while the rate for all fatal general aviation accidents declined by only 15 %, (NTSB, 2010).  
While annual fatal accident rates, especially for airlines are often volatile, other metrics tell a 
similar story.   
 
 
Concerns about drawing firm conclusions on the safety of such different types of flying 
are certainly relevant.  However, the large differences in the changes in their respective accident 
rates during this twenty-year period suggests further study of the roles played by CRM and ADM 
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